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Summary findings
International mutual funds are one of the main channels  When investing abroad, U.S. mutual funds invest more
for capital flows to emerging economies. Although  in equity than in bonds. World funds invest mainly in
mutual funds have become important contributors  to  developed nations (Canada, Europe, Japan, and the
financial market integration, little is known about their  United States). Ten percent of their investment is in Asia
investment allocation and strategies. Kaminsky, Lyons,  and Latin America. Mutual funds usually invest in a few
and Schmukler provide an overview of mutual fund  countries within each region.
activity in emerging markets.  Mutual fund investment was very responsive to the
First, they describe international mutual funds' relative  crises of the 1990s. Withdrawals from emerging markets
size, asset allocation, and country allocation.  during recent crises were large, which squares with
Second, they focus on fund behavior during crises, by  existing evidence of financial contagion.
analyzing data at the level of both investors and fund  Investments in Asian and Latin American mutual funds
managers.  are volatile. Because redemptions and injections are large
Among their findings: Equity investment in emerging  relative to total funds under management, funds' flows
markets has grown rapidly in the 1990s, much of it  are not stable. The cash held by managers during
flowing through mutual funds. Collectively, these funds  injections and redemptions  does not fluctuate
hold a sizable share of market capitalization in emerging  significantly, so investors' actions are typically reflected
economies. Asian and Latin American funds achieved the  in emerging market inflows and outflows.
fastest growth, but are smaller than domestic U.S. funds
and world funds.
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The crises initiated in Mexico  1994, Thailand 1997, and Russia  1998 had strong
spillover effects  in their regions and around  the world.  As speculative  attacks brought
down long-standing  pegs,  the  attacked countries  were driven  into some of the  deepest
recessions in  modem  times.  Even  countries that successfully  defended their  currencies
were scarred by  deep recession due to the tight monetary conditions needed to fight the
attacks. These  crises were  not confined to national  borders, nor  were they  confined to
specific regions.  The Thai  crisis engulfed-within  days-Malaysia,  Indonesia,  and  the
Philippines. The  Russian  crisis spread to  countries as far apart  as Brazil  and Pakistan.
Even  developed countries have been  affected, with the  Russian default  and  devaluation
reverberating in financial markets in the United States, Germany, and Great Britain.
The time clustering of crises in different countries  generated a vast  literature on
contagion. 2 Several papers  in the  contagion literature concluded  that financial  links are
important  in  transmitting  crises  across  countries.  There  is  evidence  that  banks  were
important in spreading the 1997 crisis, due to the lending channel, as shown by Kaminsky
and  Reinhart  (2000) and  Van Rijckeghem  and Weder  (2000). Also, various  aspects of
portfolio investors-such  as hedge funds, closed-end country funds, and mutual  funds-
were studied. [See, for example, Brown,  Goetzmann, and Park (1998), Eichengreen and
Mathieson (1998), Frankel and Schmukler (1996, 1998, and 2000), Levy Yeyati and Ubide
(1998), Bowe and Domuta (1999), Borensztein and Gelos (1999), and Kaminsky, Lyons,
and  Schmukler  (2000a and 2000b),  and  Pan, Chain,  and  Wright  (2000).] These papers
2  Many of the papers in this literature can be downloaded  from www.worldbank.or'/conta-ioi.
1conclude  that there is evidence  of institutional  panic and herding. This type of behavior
might have helped  spread crises  even to countries  with strong fundamentals.  In Kaminsky,
Lyons, and Schmukler  (2000a), we note that individuals,  too, can contribute  to this panic
by fleeing from funds-particularly mutual funds-forcing  fund managers to sell when
fundamentals  do not warrant  selling.
The focus on institutional  investors in generating  contagion is warranted by the
simple fact that they are key players  in the globalization  of financial  markets.  International
investors  integrate financial  markets by holding  assets from economies  around the world.
Cross-border  flows are important not only because they facilitate real investment and
diversify risk around the world, but also because when portfolio flows reverse, they
produce  crises and sharp output  contractions.
Cross-border  investment,  which has increased  significantly  in the 1990s,  is mainly
channeled through mutual funds and pension funds. These fund types are especially
important  for flows from developed  countries  to poorer countries. 3 Moreover, these flows
from developed to poorer countries  are large: a small fraction of a developed country's
assets  can represent  a large  proportion  of a middle-income  country's market capitalization.
The objectives of this paper are twofold. First, the paper complements  existing
work by providing an overview of the importance  and behavior of international  mutual
funds in emerging  markets. 4 The second objective is to determine whether mutual fund
investment  tends to be stable, and whether  stability  holds also for crisis times. In principle,
3 Investment by poorer-country residents in international assets has increased, but remains relatively
limited (many restrictions still apply to local institutional investors). However, in many crises, local
residents  fled the domestic  market, producing  large capital outflows  relative to inflows.
4  Mutual funds from developing countries are also becoming important in some countries, helping
develop  local capital markets. We do not cover those funds in this paper.
2one would expect that mutual funds provide  a way for individual  investors,  with long-run
horizons,  to invest in bonds and equity. (Long horizons  being relevant here because, over
the years, emerging  countries-expected to converge  to industrial countries-would need
to grow at a faster rate, and in the process  provide  higher  returns  than industrial  countries.)
In this paper, we show the stability of mutual fund flows to  emerging countries by
comparing  the flows  over time and, particularly,  by focusing  on crises.
There are two key advantages-beyond their growing importance-to  studying
mutual funds vis-i-vis other investor  types. The first is data quality. Mutual funds report
holdings to the SEC semi-annually.  In addition, private companies  compile mutual fund
data at higher frequencies,  typically quarterly,  by conducting surveys.  These data enable
analysis in  both  the  cross-sectional and  time-series dimensions. In  contrast, other
institutional  investors, like pension funds and hedge funds, are not required to disclose
holdings.  Nor have we found sources  that compile  voluntary  disclosures  for these investor
types. 5 The second key advantage,  beyond size, to  studying mutual funds is that their
emerging market investment  has grown considerably  in scope and size. There now exist
quite specialized sub-categories  within the broader mutual fund category. For example,
some funds specialize in a particular country; others specialize within a region; others
invest specifically  in emerging  markets; and others simply  invest in emerging  markets as
part of a global strategy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II  briefly describes the evolution of
capital flows to  emerging markets. Section III covers the mutual fund investment in
5Thus,  to study  the behavior  of pension  or hedge  funds  one would  need  estimates  of portfolio  changes.
Brown,  Goetzmann,  and  Park  (1998)  provide  such  estimates  for hedge  funds  during  the Asian  crisis.
3emerging  markets,  with particular  attention  to their size and holdings.  Section IV analyzes
the behavior  of mutual funds  during crises.  Section  V concludes.
II. Brief  History  of Capital  Flows
Private capital flows are important  for emerging economies, and that importance
continues  to increase over time. Private flows  now constitute  most of the capital going to
emerging markets. By 1996, private flows accounted  for 80 percent of total flows to all
developing  countries. 6 Figure 1 and 2 summarize  the major trends by plotting,  respectively,
net private capital flows  to the three largest  emerging  regions and the composition  of flows
over the past 30 years. 7
Figure 1 shows that the 1970s witnessed a remarkable surge of capital flows to
emerging  economies.  The surge  in flows  was triggered  by the oil shock  in 1973-74,  helped
by the growth of the Eurodollar  market, and amplified  by a spurt of bank lending during
1979-81.  Latin America  was the main recipient  of this heavy capital  inflow, with net flows
to the region peaking at $41 billion in 1981. Relative to regional GDP, inflows reached
about 6 percent. Flows in this episode  mostly  took the form of syndicated  bank loans, as is
shown in Figure 2. The pace of international  lending came to an abrupt  end in 1982  with
the hike in world real interest  rates to levels not seen since  the 1930s.  Suddenly,  emerging
countries  became  the pariahs  of intemational  capital  markets.  Not only were they excluded
6Emerging markets are typically defined as middle-income  developing  countries.
7The data on capital flows comes from the World Bank databases,  and from the World Bank publications
Private Capital Flows to Developing  Countries and Global Development  Finance.
4from voluntary capital  markets,  they were also forced  to run current-account  surpluses  to
repay foreign  debts.
By the late 1980s,  there was a revival of international  lending, with Latin America
becoming, once again, the darling of Wall Street. Flows to  these countries made a
tremendous  comeback.  Capital flows to Asia also surged, increasing ten-fold from their
averages in the late 1980s.  This time, however, the composition  of capital flows changed
dramatically,  with bank lending being replaced  by foreign  direct investment  and portfolio
investment.  As shown in Figure 2, bank lending  to both Asia and Latin America  declined
from 70 percent of net private capital flows  in the 1970s  to about 20 percent in the 1990s.
W.hile  foreign  direct investment  (FDI) constitutes  the largest share of capital flow to Asia
and  Latin  America, portfolio investment (bonds  and  equity)  has  also  increased
substantially, accounting for about 40 percent of total capital flows in  the 1990s. In
absolute  values,  bond and equity flows  to each region-excluding those counted as FDI-
increased  from $1 billion in 1990  to $40 billion in 1996,  with bond flows exceeding  equity
flows  since  1994  in  Latin  America.  Note,  too,  that  reported  equity  flows  are
underestimated:  any equity flow meant to acquire more than 10 percent of a company's
outstanding shares is recorded as FDI, which accounts for around 50 percent of total
capital flows.
Again in the 1990s, as in the 1980s, booms were followed by a slowdown of
capital inflows. 8 The first episode occurred in  the immediate aftermath of Mexico's
currency  crisis in December  1994. In this case, capital  inflows resumed  for most countries
Many people refer to a slowdown in inflows as a "reversal." However, the term reversal is used in the
literature in various ways. For some, a reversal is a shift from inflows to outflows. For others, a
reversal is a reduction  in inflows relative  to what is expected.
5within  six months, and returned  to their peak values  soon thereafter.  Capital  flows  to Asian
economies were largely unaffected,  with the crisis being confined to a small number of
Latin American countries.  The second, more severe slowdown  came in 1997, during the
Asian crisis. The Russian default in August 1998 aggravated this process. This time,
capital  flows collapsed  to a trickle.  The change in inflows  was similar in magnitude  to the
one after the so-called 1980s debt crisis, with total capital inflows to Latin America
declining about 35 percent and capital flows to Asia also falling about 35 percent. 9 The
decline of short-term  portfolio flows (bonds, equities, and bank lending) was even more
brutal,  with flows in these categories  declining  about 60 percent in Latin America  in 1998.
Overall, bond and equity flows to Latin America declined  between 1996 and 1998, from
about $44 billion to about $15 billion. Bond and equity flows to Asia collapsed in 1998 to
$9 billion, from their peak in 1996  of $38 billion.
In sum, portfolio flows have become important  among capital flows to emerging
markets. At the same time, portfolio flows have experienced large changes, forcing
countries  to run current account surpluses  and reduce intenal demand, which lead to the
sharp contractions in  output witnessed during recent crises. These flows are mostly
channeled  through international  institutional  investors.  In the next section, we analyze  the
investment allocation of mutual funds, one of the most important of these institutional
investors  in emerging  markets.
9 During  the  debt  crisis, capital  inflows  declined  about  24 percent  in the  first  year  of the  crisis  and  53
percent in the second year.
6III. Mutual  Fund  Investment
Different  data sources  are needed  to study the role of institutional  investors.  Unlike
the data on capital flows,  which the World  Bank collects  on a regular basis, no agency  has
complete  information  on institutional  investors.  Companies  and institutions  like the OECD,
the  Securities and  Exchange Commission (SEC), the Investment Company Institute,
Momningstar,  Emerging Market Funds Research, Frank Russell, AMG Data Services,
Lipper Analytical  Services,  and State Street  Bank have partial  information  on institutional
investors.  One can obtain a general  picture only by analyzing  and combining  the different
pieces of data, coming from various  places.
This paper contributes  to the literature not only by compiling information  from
different sources and displaying it in a  systematic way, but  also by presenting new
evidence.  The data from the World  Bank and the BIS can be found  in previous  publications
in a very similar format. The data from other sources are new evidence,  although part of
the data are displayed  in a different  format in some of the existing papers. The Appendix
Table summarizes  the data sets used in this paper and their sources.
III.a  Size of Mutual  Funds  and Institutional  Investors
Institutional  investors-including mutual funds, pension funds, hedge funds, and
insurance companies-are  a growing force in developed markets. Table 1 shows that
institutional  investors held almost $11 trillion in the United States alone in 1995. U.S.
institutions  of these four types held more than 50 percent of the assets held by institutions
across the world. When individual  investors  choose their portfolio allocation  to emerging
7markets,  they typically  make their purchase  via mutual funds.  In actively  managed funds,  it
is the fund manager who ultimately  determines  the portfolio  allocation,  by choosing how
the fund invests  its assets  (within  the limits of the fund's defined  scope).  In index funds,  the
manager's role is passive,  aimed at replicating  a predetermined  index.
Mutual funds have become one of the main instruments  for investing  in emerging
markets.  The first funds,  in the 1980s,  were closed-end  funds;  they are well suited to invest
in illiquid  markets, because their shares cannot be redeemed.  With increasing  liquidity in
emerging markets, open-end  funds have become the most widely used instrument.  It is
important  to recognize  that mutual fund investors  include  other types of institutions  as well.
For example,  more than half of pension funds  invest in emerging  markets through existing
mutual funds.  This is considered  better for liquidity  reasons and is also less expensive  than
giving  specific  mandates  to mangers.  Therefore,  by looking  at mutual funds,  one is counting
much of pension fund investment  in emerging  markets  as weli.  A survey  published  at World
Bank (1997) estimates  that pension funds hold around 1.5 to 2 percent of their portfolios
($50 billion-$70 billion) in assets  from emerging  markets.
Hedge funds  are a newer type of institutional  investor.  They are still small relative
to the other  institutional  investor  types. It is estimated  that hedge funds held total assets of
around $81 billion by year-end 1997, only a small fraction of which is invested in
emerging markets.' 0 Like other institutional investors, insurance companies are also
believed to invest only a small proportion  of their assets in emerging markets. However,
0  See Eichengreen  and Mathieson (1998) for a detailed study on hedge funds.
8unlike hedge funds,  they hold a large amount of assets. More evidence  on the investment
allocation  of this industry  is needed."'
Of course, institutional investors in developed countries allocate part of their
international investment to  both  in  developed and  emerging markets. International
portfolios  are more concentrated  in equities than in bonds. However,  banks invest  part of
their own capital and  some of  their clients'  assets in  foreign bonds. Even though
institutional investors diversify internationally,  there still exists a strong home bias. For
example,  according  to the World Bank (1997), U.S. equity pension funds held less than 9
percent of their assets in international  instruments, and around 2 percent in emerging
markets  (in 1994).
Even when international  institutional  investors only hold a small fraction of their
portfolio  in emerging  markets,  they have an important  presence  in these economies,  given
the relatively small size of their capital markets. Table 2 shows that funds dedicated to
emerging markets alone hold on average between 4 and 15 percent of the Asian, Latin
American, and transition economies' market capitalization.  For comparison, Table  1
shows that holdings of U.S. mutual funds accounted  for 15 percent of the U.S. market
capitalization  (in 1996).  In countries  like Japan and the U.K., domestic  funds held 4 and 8
percent  of the local market  capitalization  in the same  year.
In fact, the above estimates  are conservative,  because we have only included the
holdings  of dedicated  emerging  market  equity  funds.  This database  excludes  the holdings  of
world  funds, which  account for  a  substantially larger  share  of  the  stock  market
t  Beyond institutional investors, it is difficult to determine the direct holdings of individual investors.
There are no regulatory  agencies-like  the Securities  and Exchange Commission  (SEC) or the Bank
for International Settlements (BIS)-or  private companies-like  Morningstar or Lipper Analytical
Services-that  keep appropriate  records.
9capitalization  of emerging markets. 12 13 Moreover, some of the outstanding equity in
emerging markets-as  well as  in  many developed countries-is  not publicly traded
because  it belongs to the families  or corporations  that control  the companies.  In sum, even
though we cannot  provide  precise estimates,  one can argue that international  mutual funds
hold a large  and significant  proportion  of the publicly available  equity.
Table 2 shows  that the presence  of mutual funds  has grown  substantially  during  the
1990s. Though net equity flows have declined from their 1993 peak-about  27 billion
dollars  to Latin America and 21 billion dollars  to Asia-the  relative importance  of mutual
funds has grown substantially.  For example,  dedicated  emerging  market equity funds held
$21 billion  in Latin-American  stocks  at the end of 1995.  By December  1997,  their holdings
had  increased to  $40 billion. While mutual funds'  growth in  Asia  has  been less
pronounced,  the presence of mutual funds is still important  in many countries. Overall,
dedicated  emerging  market mutual funds  held $77 billion in Asia at the onset of the crisis
(December 1996). While the absolute amount of mutual fund investment in transition
economies is not comparable  to that in Asia and Latin America, funds' growth in these
transition  economies  has been remarkable.  In fact, in terms of market capitalization,  mutual
12 The data come from Emerging Market Funds Research, which collects aggregate data of emerging
market mutual funds to track the net cash flows of nearly 1,400  international  emerging market equity
funds, with an average position of  about $120 billion in 1996. The data set covers both U.S.
registered and offshore funds as well as funds registered in Luxembourg,  United Kingdom, Ireland,
Cayman Islands, Canada, and Switzerland.  It includes both open and closed-end  funds. Our data start
with the Mexican crisis and end in March 1999.  Thus, it includes observations  on the major currency
crises of the 1990s.
13  For example, the mutual fund industry  estimates that international  mutual funds hold between 60 and 70
percent of the market capitalization  in Hungary, instead of the estimates obtained in Table 2, which
all are below 30 percent. We thank Jonathan  Garner, from DLJ, for raising this point.
10funds have become big players in these markets, with their positions reaching large
proportions  in Hungary  and Poland.
IIb  Holdings  of U.S. Mutual  Funds
In this sub-section,  we focus  specifically  on the mutual fund industry  in the U.S. We
saw in Table I just how important  the U.S. mutual fund industry  is: it accounted  for almost
60 percent of world mutual funds in 1995.  Table 3 presents  information  on the number  of
funds in the U.S., their net asset value, and the share of the largest funds  in the second  half
of the 1990s, reported according to the geographical  specialization  of their investment.
Figure 3 displays  the allocation  of mutual fund assets at the end of 1998,  by asset type and
by regional  exposure. 
14
Table 3 shows that the U.S. mutual  fund industry  expanded  significantly  during  the
1990s.  The total number of bond and stock funds increased from 2,355 to 10,144 from
1991  to 1998.  Most assets  were in bonds  up to the end of 1993.  In the last five years, most
assets  switched  to equity,  increasing  from 50 percent at the end of 1994  to 68 percent at the
end of 1998.  The rest is mostly  allocated  to bonds (between  24 and 40 percent). Their net
asset value increased from $705 billion to $3.6 trillion  between 1991  and 1998.
The exposure of U.S. mutual funds to emerging markets expanded substantially
during the 1990s as well. U.S. based open-end  mutual funds had around $35 billion in
emerging  markets  by the end of 1996, from about $1 billion at the end of 1991. Figure 3
shows that, in 1998,  74 percent of the assets  were held in assets from U.S. and Canada, 10
11percent in European assets, 1 percent in Japanese assets, 1.3 in Asian assets, and 0.9
percent  in Latin American  assets.  Although  the percentage  dedicated  to emerging  markets  is
small,  the large size of the U.S. mutual fund industry  implies  that the dollar amount  held in
assets  from emerging  countries  is significant.
Turning  now to world funds,  the number  of funds  in this category  grew from 52 to
273 in the 1991-1998  period.  The total net asset value increased from $16 billion to $125
billion over the same period. Most assets are allocated in stocks (between 83 and 87
percent). Bond holdings are small (between 2 and 4 percent). At the end of 1998,  world
funds' assets were 34 percent  from the U.S. and Canada,  37 percent from Europe,  4 percent
from  Japan, 3 percent from Latin  America,  and 6 percent  from Asia.
The most rapidly growing fund categories  since 1991 are the emerging market
funds, Asia funds, and Latin American funds (though these fimds did start from a low
level).  Emerging  market funds increa.sed  from 3 funds  in 1991  to 165 in 1998.  The total net
asset value increased from $142 million to $13.5 billion over the same period, with a peak
of $17 billion in late 1997.  These funds hold between  70 and 90 percent in stocks and the
rest  in  short-term interest-bearing securities ("cash"). In  late  1998, 84 percent was
allocated  to stocks. Regarding  the geographic  allocation,  30 percent was allocated  in Asia,
30 percent in Latin America,  and 11 percent in Europe.
Asia funds, excluding  specialized  Japanese  funds, grew from 11 funds in 1991 to
154 in 1998. Their net assets grew from $1 billion to $6.5 billion over the same period.
Nevertheless,  due to the Asian crisis, the total assets of Asian funds deteriorated  during
14 Morningstar classifies the assets as being invested in one of six Countries/Regions:  U.S. and Canada,
Japan, Asia (ex Japan), Europe, Latin America, or other. Holdings  are classified in one of four asset
classes: cash, stocks, bonds, or other.
121997  and 1998. At the end of 1996,  the net asset value of Asia funds  peaked,  reaching $16
billion. One year later, the net asset value  was $9 billion.  These funds  tend to hold at least
90 percent of their assets  in stocks and the rest in cash. On December  31, 1998,  21 percent
was invested  in Japan and 68 in the rest of Asia. The number of Latin American  funds
increased from  1 to  47 between 1991 and  1998. Their net  asset values increased
dramatically  from $44 million  to $1.8  billion.  At the end of 1998,  the Latin American  funds
held 88 percent of their assets  in stocks  and 7 percent  in cash.
Within each fund-type  category,  assets are concentrated  in the largest funds. (This
does not hold for "All U.S. Funds" because 20 funds is a quite small share of the total
number  of funds). Since 1991,  the 20 largest world funds represented  between 71 and 81
percent of this category.  In the same period, emerging  market funds captured  between 67
and 100 percent of the market. The top 20 Asia funds accounted  for 71-97 percent of the
market.  In the case of the Latin American  funds,  the top funds  accounted,  on average,  for 95
percent  of the  market.
Returning to Table 2, one can observe that not all the countries have the same
representation  in dedicated  mutual fund portfolios.  Some countries  capture a large share of
mutual fund assets. For example, Brazil, Mexico, Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, and
Taiwan  receive the highest  weight in mutual funds' portfolios;  Colombia,  Venezuela,  and
China  receive  quite low weights.  The country  shares change  over time.
In Asia, mutual funds invest primarily in Hong Kong, India, Korea, Malaysia,
Taiwan, and Thailand.  Between 1995 and 1998,  the share in Malaysia decreased  from 12
percent to 4 percent, while the share in India Taiwan rose from 7 percent to around 14
percent.  The top holding  tends to be Hong  Kong,  with a share between 19 and 30 percent  of
13the fund assets. In Latin America,  funds  mostly invest  in seven countries.  On average they
hold the following  portfolio:  Brazil (38 percent), Mexico  (30), Argentina (13), Chile (11),
Peru (3), Colombia (2),  and Venezuela (2). The two  largest countries-Brazil  and
Mexico-account on average  for 68 percent of the funds' holdings;  while the four largest
countries-Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico-account  for 93 percent of the assets.
Funds hold large positions in ADRs/GDRs  (American  and Global Depository  Receipts),
traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Therefore,  they often do not trade in the local
stock markets  when investing  abroad.  Within  the sample  period,  the share  for Mexico  grew
from 26 to 34 percent.' 5 In the case of transition  economies,  mutual fund investment  is
concentrated  on five countries.  On average, they hold assets in the Czech Republic (13
percent),  Hungary  (21), Poland (24), Russia  & CIS (40), and the Slovak Republic (2). The
shares  are volatile,  for example,  with Russia  raging from 25 to 59 percent.
IV. The  Behavior  of Mutual  Funds  during  Crises
Crises  in the 1990s  have not been country-specific,  or even  region-specific. Indeed,
there is consensus  that crises have a contagious  nature, with currency  turmoil spreading  to
countries  as far apart as Argentina,  the Czech Republic, and South Africa. Crises before
1990 also had a contagious  nature, witness the debt crisis in 1982. But until recently,
contagion  tended to be regional.  The 1990s  changed  that. While the Asian flu was mostly
confined  to south East Asia, it also triggered currency  turmoil in Argentina,  Mexico,  and
Chile. The speculative  attack on the Hong Kong dollar in October 1997 also traveled  the
5Data from Morningstar  and SEC for Latin American funds show an almost identical picture.
14globe,  with even  the stock market  in the United  States  suffering  sizable  losses following  the
1  5-percent  fall of the Hang Seng index.  The epidemic  became  more widespread  following
the Russian default in August 1998, with stock market prices in all industrial countries
declining  between  20 and 50 percent.  The contagious  nature of these recent crises has been
partly attributed  to financial  links, as we noted above.
The behavior  of mutual funds can be consistent  with contagion,  either because  they
generate  spillovers  or due to their feedback  trading. First, international  mutual funds can
contribute to spreading crises across countries if, for example, investors holding fund
shares might decide to sell their Asian funds when Russia devalues  its currency.  Or fund
managers  of Latin American funds may sell assets in Brazil when a crisis hits Mexico.
These need not  be irrational responses: new theories of rational herding explain the
transmission  of crises through financial links. These models are based on elements like
asymmetric  information  and cross-market  hedging.  16 Alternatively,  if mutual fund investors
or managers follow past or current returns, their behavior will appear consistent with
contagion  even though  mutual  funds  are not main force  driving  the spillovers.
On the other hand, it is also possible  that institutional  investors,  like mutual funds,
can  be a stabilizing  force.  If investors  buy mutual fund shares  for long-run  gains,  they might
not withdraw  their investments  when there is a temporary  crisis. For example,  Marcis  et al.
6 For example, in the model of Calvo and Mendoza (1998), the costs of gathering country-specific
information induce rational investors to follow the herd. In the model of Calvo (1998), uninforned
investors replicate  selling by  liquidity-squeezed informed investors, because  the  uninformed
investors mistakenly (but rationally)  believe that these sales are signaling worsening fundamentals.
Kodres  and  Pritsker  (1999)  focus  on  investors  who  engage  in  cross-market  hedging  of
macroeconomic  risks. In that paper, international market comovement can occur in the absence of
any relevant information, and even in the absence of direct common factors across countries. For
example, a negative shock to one country can lead informed investors to sell that country's assets
and buy assets of another country, increasing their exposure to the idiosyncratic factor of the second
country. Investors then hedge this new position by selling the assets of a third country, completing
the chain of contagion from the first country  to the third.
15(1995) and Rea (1996) claim that shareholders did not redeem shares during crisis
periods. Rather, they argue that net inflows to emerging markets are usually steady, and
crisis-period outflows are small and short-lived  (at least during Mexico's crisis). Froot,
O'Connell, and  Seasholes (2000) present a  related picture, but  without focusing on
institutional investors. They analyze, among other things, aggregated net flows into
individual  emerging  markets.  Though net inflows  decreased  during the Mexican and Asian
crises,  they find little evidence  of net outflows.
In this section  we provide  evidence  on the stability  of mutual fund investment  and
the behavior  of mutual funds  following  speculative  attacks.  Where possible,  we distinguish
the behavior  of mutual  fund managers  from the actions  of underlying  investors.  This section
examines  data sets from various sources,  including  the Emerging  Market Funds Research,
Momingstar,  the SEC,  and the BIS.
IV.a  Mutual  Fund  Flows
We first examine  the evidence  of net flows  from dedicated  emerging  market mutual
funds  to Asia, Latin America,  and transition  economies  (data from Emerging  Market  Funds
Research).  Figure 4 shows the average quarterly  net flows to these regions from 1995  to
1999. On balance, mutual fund flows to emerging markets since 1995 have been muted,
reaching  about $20 billion, with booms in the capital  flows being followed  by pronounced
outflows, which were not persistent in the aftermath  of the tequila crisis. Outflows  from
Latin America  reached about $4 billion  in 1995,  but mutual funds increased  their positions
in Latin America by about $2 billion in the first half of 1996. The tequila crisis did not
have any spillovers  in Asia or in transition economies.  In fact, flows to Asia ballooned  to
16almost $11 billion, while flows to transition  economies  remained  stable throughout  1995-
96. The picture changes after the outburst of currency  turmoil in Asia. This time, mutual
funds pulled out not only from Asia, but from Latin America as well, with net outflows
from Latin America reaching  about $1 billion in the six months following  the collapse of
the Thai  baht. Overall  in 1998,  mutual  fund withdrawals  took a turn for the worse,  reaching
about $4 billion in Asia, with substantial outflows from Latin America and transition
economies.
Figure 5 provides  a higher  resolution  picture of the spillover  effects  in crisis times.
It shows how the crisis, initiated  in one country,  triggered withdrawals  in other countries.
The figure reports average quarterly flows  (as a percent of mutual funds' initial positions)
to emerging countries  in the two quarters  following  the recent crises. The top panel is the
aftermath  of the Mexican  devaluation  in December 1994,  the middle panel is the aftermath
of the collapse  of the Thai baht in July 1997,  and the bottom panel is the aftermath  of the
Russian devaluation  and moratorium  in August 1998. To isolate the behavior of mutual
funds in crisis times, we subtract the mean flow (also in percent of their initial positions)
during the entire sample, 1995-1999.17  For example,  following  the Mexican devaluation,
mutual funds sold about 5 percent of their Brazilian  positions (relative to their average
quarterly  buying/selling  during 1995  to 1999).  Thus, as shown in the first panel in Figure 5,
Brazil experienced  unusual  withdrawals  of about 5 percent in the aftermath  of the Mexican
devaluation.  To convey  more clearly the extent of contagion across regions following  the
initial speculative  attack,  we organize  the country  data according  to the degree of severity
7 Models of asset trade (e.g., microstructure finance models) provide a theoretical basis for focusing on
changes in flow relative to what is expected;  here, the latter is proxied by average flow.
17of the outflows.  Thus, for example,  Malaysia  was the country  most affected  in the aftennath
of the Russian  crisis, with abnormal  outflows  of approximately  30 percent.
As  discussed above, the repercussion of  the  three  episodes of  crises was
dramatically  different. The so-called tequila crisis was circumscribed  to Latin America.
Moreover, "abnormal" mutual fund withdrawals  following the collapse of the Mexican
peso were confined to  a handful of Latin American countries, with only Brazil and
Venezuela-besides the crisis country,  Mexico-suffering average withdrawals  of 5 and 2
percent in the two quarters  following  the devaluation.  In contrast,  mutual funds increased
their exposure to Asian countries and transition economies, with (above-trend) flows
oscillating  around  4 percent for Asia and 11 percent  for the transition  economies.
The aftermath of the collapse of the Thai baht presents a different  picture of the
international  mutual funds industry. It is in this episode that we first observe signs of a
more general retrenchment  of mutual funds in emerging markets. Mutual fund flows to
Asian economies are basically all well below trend in the two quarters following the
collapse of the Thai baht. Only flows  to China,  Pakistan,  and Sri Lanka are above average.
Interestingly,  after the collapse of the Thai baht, we observe substantial  withdrawals  from
Hong Kong, Singapore,  Taiwan, with average quarterly withdrawals  oscillating at about
12 percent above average in the case of Singapore  and Taiwan, and about 7 percent for
Hong Kong. The retrenchment  this time also reaches Latin America and the transition
economies,  with withdrawals  reaching about 6 percent for Colombia  and 4 percent for the
Czech Republic during the two quarters following the outbreak of the  Thai crisis.
Colombia,  the Czech  Republic,  Chile,  Hungary,  and Peru are the countries  most affected  in
this episode,  with outflows  about  3 percent above  average.
18The flight away from emerging markets becomes more pronounced during the
Russian crisis, with about half of the countries  in the sample experiencing  abnormal sales
of about 10 percent or even larger.  In some cases, withdrawals were massive. For
example, average mutual funds sales in Malaysia reached 30 percent and in the Czech
Republic were about 16 percent. Some Latin American countries  were also dramatically
affected following  the Russian collapse.  For example,  Colombia and Venezuela  suffered
average  quarterly  outflows  of about  8 percent.  Mutual  fund investments  in Mexico  and Peru
were the only ones that did not suffer following  the worldwide  turmoil triggered by the
Russian  default. In fact, inflows to Mexico  were 5 percent above the average observed in
the 1995-99  period.
IV.b Investors  and Managers
Though mutual funds are commonly  included among institutional  investors,  they
differ from hedge funds, pension funds, and insurance  companies  in the degree to which
underlying investors control portfolio size. Funds' behavior is thus determined  by the
decisions  of both managers and investors." 8 This hybrid nature certainly affects mutual
funds' flows  to countries  and regions, as described  in the previous sub-section.
This characteristic  gives us a unique opportunity  to study in detail the behavior of
two groups  of agents.  In Kaminsky,  Lyons, and Schmukler  (2000a),  we study  the behavior
of these groups,  focusing  on whether  their trading strategies  are driven  by current  and past
retums (e.g., momentum  trading-the  buying of past winners and selling of past losers).
19Here, we provide more evidence  on the influence  of each group, reporting detailed data
from the BIS and the SEC. These data sets help us isolate the behavior of investors and
managers.
The behavior of underlying investors is described in Figures 6 and 7. Figure 6
shows the cash flows to Asian mutual funds  over time,  based in the U.S. and the U.K. This
decision  belongs to investors.  The figure shows that inflows  to Asia were high before the
Asian crisis, particularly  in 1995-96.  After the Thai devaluation  of 1997, large outflows
took place in the second half of 1997.  The outflows  continued  in 1998,  being particularly
large  after the Russian  crisis in the U.S.-based  funds.
Figure 7 provides  related information,  plotting  the evolution of aggregate  net asset
positions and the injections/redemptions  into/from  the 13 Latin American  mutual funds.' 9
Again, the latter are part of the investors' decision set. Injections (redemptions) are
measured  by the percentage  increase  (decline)  in the number  of shares  held by each mutual
fund (to control for fund size changes due to capital gains and losses). The pattern of
inflows and outflows corresponds  to the recent crises. During the Mexican crisis, there
were large redemptions from Latin American funds, accounting for 25 percent of the
outstanding  shares in the first quarter  of 1995.  Injections  resumed  to Latin American  funds
8 Mutual funds here means open-end,  non-index  funds, which account for most of the funds that invest in
emerging markets. For closed-end funds, investors do not control portfolio size. For index funds,
managers have little control over portfolio holdings.
19 The data come from Momingstar and the SEC. We work with holdings of the largest 13 Latin-America
equity funds (open-end) from April 1993 to January 1999 (24 quarters). Those funds are Fidelity
Latin America,  Morgan Stanley  Dean Witter Institutional  Latin America,  Van Kampen Latin America
(formerly Morgan Stanley), BT Investment Latin America Equity, TCW Galileo Latin America
Equity, TCW/Dean Witter Latin America Growth, Excelsior Latin America, Govett Latin America,
Ivy South America, Scudder Latin America, T. Rowe Price Latin America, Merrill Lynch Latin
America, and Templeton Latin America. Not all of these funds existed from the beginning of our
sample; on average  we have about 10 quarters of data (out of a possible 24) per fund.
20until the last quarter  of 1997,  during  the Asian crisis.  Redemptions  continued  during 1998,
increasing  during the Russian  crisis, and reaching  20 percent in late 1998 and early 1999.
As depicted  in the graph, the fluctuations  in injections/redemptions  influence  the funds' net
asset values,  which are also determined  by movements  in the underlying  stock prices.
The patterns of Figures 6 and 7 are closely associated to the ones on Figure 4.
During the Mexican crisis, investors  pulled out of Latin American  funds, and there was a
large outflow from Latin American  countries.  Then, investors  and flows returned to Latin
American  countries  until the last quarter of 1997,  when the Thai crisis expanded to other
countries.  In Asia, there are no signs  of fund outflows  or investor  redemptions  during the
Mexican  crisis, but there are large effects  during  the Asian crisis. This pattern suggests  that
investors' decisions  influence  fund flows.
Now we turn to the managers.  Managers  cannot control  the injections/redemptions
of  underlying investors. What they can control is the use  of "cash" or  "short-term
positions" (e.g., U.S. Treasury bills). These positions help to  buffer portfolios from
redemptions.  Holding assets that are highly liquid allows managers to meet redemptions
without the need to sell less liquid assets. In principle, this can mute the volatility of
investment outflows. However, managers can also reinforce investors actions if  they
increase  their liquid positions  in times of investor  retrenchment.  In this case, the volatility
of flows is amplified. It is also true that-in  multiple-country  portfolios-the  decision
about which country to withdraw from belongs to the managers. 20 21
20 Investors  obviously  determine  the withdrawal  country  in  the case  of single-country  funds.
21 There  are  two  drawbacks  to this  data  set. First,  here  we use  data  only  from  Latin  American  funds.  In the
future, it will be interesting  to study  the behavior  of managers  by considering  a broader  set of
mutual-fund  types.  Second,  our data do not provide  a complete  picture  of managers'  responses  to
liquidity  squeezes  because  we  do not  have  information  on  funds' credit  lines  with  banks.  Funds  mired
in redemptions  may  have  resorted  to using  such  credit  lines.
21Interestingly,  short-term  positions  do not change as funds experience  redemptions
or injections.  This is clear from Table 4, which examines  managers' choices about short-
term positions. The first row shows average short-term  positions for all mutual funds. On
average, the funds in our sample hold approximately  5 percent of their assets in liquid
positions.  The next three rows examine  short-term  positions  in more detail according  to the
size of the mutual fund. Again,  we examine  whether  the size of the liquid  positions  changes
according  to whether funds  experience  redemptions  or injections.  For the period examined,
it is the large funds that hold a larger share of their positions  in liquid assets. This evidence
is somewhat  unexpected  because  these are the funds that are likely to have better access  to
bank credit lines and thus do not need to hold large liquid positions. With respect to the
funds' behavior  in times of redemption  and injection,  both large and small mutual funds
hold smaller liquid positions in times of redemption, indicating that fund managers'
behavior has helped to smooth the effects of investors' withdrawals  on equity markets in
Latin America. Medium-size funds, by contrast, hold more liquid assets in times of
redemption,  thus  magnifying  investors'  withdrawals  from emerging  markets.
V. Conclusion
The increasing  globalization  of financial  markets and the crises of the 1990s  have
spawned  a vigorous literature  on fmancial  integration,  international  financial  architecture,
and contagion.  In this literature,  a central  element  of the debate is the behavior of financial
markets. In particular,  many have argued that financial  markets are volatile and prone to
contagion. Most of this literature has focused on market imperfections,  and how these
22imperfections  lead to herding behavior and financial cycles that are unrelated to market
fundamentals.
Though previous studies have covered several dimensions of foreign investors'
role in emerging markets, this paper provides an overview of a missing dimension-the
importance  and behavior of international  mutual funds.  Institutional  investors  are the main
channel of financial flows to emerging  markets, and mutual funds are large among the
institutional  investors.  Moreover,  they are the only class of institutional  investors  for which
reliable data are available on an ongoing  basis.
Several  general  findings  emerged.  First, equity  investment  in emerging  markets  has
grown rapidly in the 1990s. A significant  proportion of that equity flow is channeled
through mutual funds. Collectively,  these funds are large investors, and hold a sizeable
share of market capitalization  in emerging  countries.
Second, at the same time that mutual funds in general have experienced rapid
growth,  Asian and Latin American  funds were the ones achieving  the fastest growth.  Their
size  remains  small,  however,  when compared  to domestic  U.S. funds  and world  funds.
Third,  when investing  abroad,  U.S. mutual funds invest  mostly  in equity  rather than
bonds. Funds in the "World" category mainly invest in developed nations (the U.S.,
Canada,  Europe,  and Japan). Ten percent of their investment  is devoted  to Asia and Latin
America.  Mutual funds mainly invest in the some countries  within each region. In Latin
America,  they primarily  invest  in Brazil and Mexico,  then in Argentina  and Chile. In Asia,
the largest shares are in Hong Kong, India, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Thailand. In
transition economies, mutual funds invest most of the assets in  the Czech Republic,
Hungary,  Poland,  and Russia & CIS.
23Fourth,  mutual fund investment  was very responsive  during the crises of the 1  990s.
The Mexican  crisis mostly  affected  Latin America,  while  the Asian and Russian crises had
a large impact on Asian and Latin American funds. These findings are consistent  with
previous  finding  in the contagion  literature  and with reports  by industry  analysts.
Fifth, the investment  of underlying  investors  of Asian and Latin American  funds is
volatile. Injections and redemptions  are large relative to total funds under management.
The cash held by managers  during injections/redemptions  does not fluctuate significantly,
so the investors' actions  are typically  reflected  in emerging  market inflows  and outflows.
To conclude,  there are many  questions  that provide  material for future  research.  To
test theories of financial crises, it would be  valuable to  examine the link between
institutional-investor  behavior  and country/market  characteristics.  Also, it would be useful
to compare  the behavior  of different  types of funds-such  as world, emerging  market, and
regional  funds-to  provide evidence  for discussions  of international  financial  architecture.
These  are areas that we are currently  researching.  Beyond studying institutional  investors,
it would also be interesting to analyze the behavior of banks'  proprietary trading in
emerging  markets.  This is an area  where hard evidence  is almost  completely  lacking.
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Total Net Private Capital Flows to Developing Countries
(Billions of U.S. Dollars)
East Asia & Pacific
140
120
100  5  I
80
60  ~  f  3  f~
40
20
N  w  G  o  0  N  CID  co  0  N  q  o  co  0
rn  os  m  o0  on  o0  o0  o  om  atn  t  at  at  a






N  -q  C  co  0  N  t  CO  00  0  N  11`  C  co
N  N  N  CO  c  co  c  o  0  0  en  cn  O  0  a





20  ,  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _i;
N  t  cO  o  0  N  m  t  C  co  0  N  to  co
r-  0)  0-  0)  0)  0  0)  0  0)  0D  0)  0  0)  0
The  figures  display  net  capital  flows  to  developing  countries,  including  bank  and  trade-related  lending,  portfolio  equity
and  bond  flows,  and  foreign  direct  investment.
The  countries  comprising  Labn  America  & Caribbean  are  Antigua  and  Barbuda,  Argentina,  Barbados,  Beize,  BoMvia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia,  Costa Pica, Cuba, Dominica,  Dominican  Republic,  Ecuador,  El  Salvador,  Grenada,
Guadeloupe,  Guatemala,  Guyana,  Haiti,  Honduras,  Jamaica,  Mexico,  Nicaragua,  Panama,  Paraguay,  Peru,  Puerto
Rico, St. Kitts  and Nevis,  St. Lucia,  St.  Vincent  and  the Grenadines,  Suriname,  Trinkiad  and  Tobago,  Uruguay,
Venezuela.
The  countries  comprising  East  Asia  & PaciFic  are  American  Samoa,  Cambodia,  China.  Flpi,  Indonesia,  Kiribati,  Korea,
Dem.  Rep.,  Lao  PDR,  Malaysia,  Marshall  Islands,  Micronesia,  Fed. Sts.,  Mongoia,  Myanmar,  Palau,  Papua  New
Guinea,  Philippines,  Samoa,  Solomon  Islands,  Thailand,  Tonga,  Vanuatu,  Vietnam.
The  countries  comprising  Europe  & Central  Asia  are  Albania,  Armenia,  Azerbaian,  Belarus,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,
Bulgaria,  Croatia,  Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Georgia,  Hungary,  Isle  of Man,  Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyz  Republic,  Latvia,
Lfthuania,  Macedonia  FYR,  Moldova,  Poland,  Romania,  Russian  Federation,  Slovak  Republic,  Tajikistan,  Turkey,
Turkmenistan,  Ukraine,  Uzbekistan,  Poland,  Romania,  Russian  Federabon,  Slovak  Republic,  Tajlkistan,  Turkey,
Turkmenistan,  Ukraine,  Uzbekistan,  Yugoslavia  FR  (SerbiatMontenegro).
Source:  The  Wordd  BankFigure 2
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The figures display net capital  flows to developing  countries  by type of flow: bank and trade-related  lending, portfolio  equity
and bond  flows, and foreign  direct  investment.
The countries  comprising  Latin America & Caribbean  are Antigua and Barbuda,  Argentina,  Barbados,  Belize, Bolivia,  Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa  Rica,  Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,  El  Salvador, Grenada, Guadeloupe,
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,  Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, St. Kitts and
Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent  and the Grenadines,  Suriname,  Trinidad and  Tobago, Uruguay,  Venezuela.
The countries  comprising  East Asia & Pacific  are American  Samoa,  Cambodia,  China, Fiji, Indonesia,  Kiribati,  Korea, Dem.
Rep.,  Lao PDR, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Fed. Sts., Mongolia, Myanmar, Palau, Papua New  Guinea,
Philippines,  Samoa,  Solomon  Islands,  Thailand,  Tonga,  Vanuatu,  Vietnam.
The countries comprising Europe & Central Asia are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Bulgaria,  Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia,  Hungary,  Isle of Man, Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyz  Republic, Latvia, Lithuania,
Macedonia FYR, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan,
Ukraine, Uzbekistan,  Poland, Romania, Russian Federation,  Slovak Republic, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan,  Ukraine,
Uzbekistan,  Yugoslavia  FR (Serbia/Montenegro).
Source:  The World  BankTable  1
International  Institutional  Investors
Percentage  of Global  Assets Held by the United  States and
Euro  e in 1995
Pension  Funds  66  24
Insurance  Companies
Total  37  37
Life Insurance  35  36
Non-life Insurance  45  37
Mutual  Funds
Total  59  33
Open-end  65  34
Closed-end  57  41
Aggregate
Percentage  52  32
Billions of U.S. Dollars  10,994  6,666
Snapshot  of Mutual  Funds'  Total  Assets  in  1996
Percentage  of Total Mutual  Fund  Assets Held  by Each  Country
1  76  1  9  1  41
By Type of Fund,  As a Percentage  of
Money Market  25  29  0  45
Bond  22  45  5  29
Equity  49  24  88  11
Balanced  3  2  6  14
As a Percentage  of
GDP  46  9  16  34
Market  Capitalization  15  4  l  8  18
The table reproduces  the results from the BIS Annual Report. The top panel displays the distribut
of institutional  investors  between  the U.S. and Europe in 1995.  The lower panel shows  the size  of
mutual fund industry in the U.S., Japan, the U.K., and France. The upper  part of the lower pa
reports  the percent distribution  of mutual  fund assets among the four countries.
Source:  Bank for International  Settlements,  68th  Annual ReportTable 2
Holdings of Dedicated  Emerging Market Fund Assets and Their Relative Importance
(in Billions of U.S. Dollars)
5S,  x  . ,  ,-V.e ,2  '  ..  /  W*>MdSw
China  ~~~1.9  4  2.3  3  3.1  2  1.9  1
Hong Kong  12.6  n/a  20.4  n/a  13.2  n/a  9.4  n/a
India  4.5  3  6.1  4  7.4  5  5.6  5
Indonesia  4.5  9  5.5  7  1.9  2  1.3  7
Korea  10.3  6  7.7  5  2.5  2  7.3  11
Malaysia  8.2  4  12.0  4  2.4  1  1.5  2
Pakistan  0.6  6  0.5  5  0.8  7  0.2  3
Philippines  3.4  6  4.2  6  1.7  3  1.9  6
Singapore  5.1  n/a  5.3  n/a  3.0  n/a  3.8  n/a
Sri Lanka  0.2  9  0.1  5  0.2  10  0.1  7
Taiwan  4.6  2  7.2  3  5.9  2  5.7  2
Thailand  9.8  7  5.9  4  2.2  4  3.1  10
Pakistan0667.2  .5  ....  . '''.2  . .,  '  ¶7  '  '  3''  _
Argentina  3.1  9  3.3  8  4.6  9  3.1  6
Brazil  8.1  5  11.5  6  15.4  6  8.3  4
Chile  3.4  5  2.9  4  3.4  4  2.6  4
Colombia  0.4  2  0.6  4  0.6  3  0.3  2
Mexico  5.5  6  7.8  7  13.4  10  7.9  7
Peru  0.7  7  0.9  7  1.1  6  0.7  5
Venezuela  0.3  6  07  12  1.26  9  0.5  5
:~gjg~~,  2t S0:  6  - T_3f.  27  . . 0  3>37  7  ^  .230  5.
Czech Republic  0.5  3  1.0  6  1.0  6  0.7  6
Hungary  0.4  25  1.2  29  2.3  26  2.2  16
Poland  0.7  18  1.5  20  1.9  17  2.2  14
Russia & CIS  1.0  n/a  2.6  10  7.5  7  1.7  3
Slovak Republic  0.1  n/a  0.1  4  0.1  5  0.1  8 ff0"  wd Econ;  o 1  !  '  .,  6  X  j14  t  ;12.f  .12  .. :.  . v  =7s00  . J0
The table displays the country holdings of dedicated emerging market funds (based inside and outside the U.S.) and the holdings as a percent of the corresponding country
stock market capitalization. The figures only count the holdings of the dedicated emerging market funds. Thus, the importance of all foreign mutual funds in each country is
significantly larger, in most cases.
Source: Emerging Market Funds Research and International Finance CorporationTable 3
Size of U.S. Mutual  Fund Universe
AR U.S. Funds
NAV, Billions of U.S. Dollars  705  933  1,338  1,428  1,838  2,335  2,954  3,570
NumberofFunds  2,355  2,522  3,422  5,594  6,937  7,746  8,655  10,144
NAV of Top 20 Largest Funds asa  2
Percent of All U.S. Funds  2  2  3  4  3  4  4  3
Asia Pacific Funds
NAV, Billions ofU.S. Dollars  1.1  1.4  8.4  11.9  12.1  16.4  9.0  6.5
NumberofFunds  11  14  27  59  79  106  127  154
NAV of Top 20 Largest Funds as a
Percent of Asia  Pacific Funds  100  100  97  94  94  93  90  82
Emeraina Market  Funds
NAV,BillionsofU.S.Dollars  0.1  0.5  3.7  8.7  8.5  15.6  16.9  13.5
NumberofFunds  3  7  10  32  64  94  119  165
NAV of Top 20 Largest Funds as  100  100  100  92  89  72  71  67
Percent of Emerging Market Fund  0
Latin America  Funds
NAV,BillionsofU.S.Dollars  0.04  0.2  1.3  3.9  2.5  2.9  4.1  1.8
NumberofFunds  1  3  5  15  25  28  35  47
PercentofLatp  Amercan Funds  100  100  100  100  73  95  97  95
World Funds
NAV, Billions of U.S. Dollars  16.1  18.3  28.1  45.4  58.1  82.0  108.1  125.4
Number  of Funds  52  56  78  143  180  198  223  273
NAY of Top 20 Largest Funds as  18743716797
Percent of World Funds  81  80  74  73  71  76  79  77
The table displays the net asset value (NAV) and number of U.S.-based mutual funds. The funds are divided in  five categories by investment
allocation: all funds, Asia Pacific funds, emerging market funds, Latin America funds, and world funds.
Source: MomingstaaFigure 3 --U.S. Mutual Fund Assets
December 31, 1998
By Asset Type
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Mutual Funds: Quaterly Flows to Emerging Countries
(Billions  of U.S.  Dollars)
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Notes:  Latin  American  countries include Argentina, Brazil,,Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela.
Asian countries  include China. Hong Kong, India, Indonesia.  Korea.  Malaysia, Pakistan,  Philippines, Singapore,  Sri Lanka,  Taiwan. Thailand.
Trsnsifion economies  include Czech Republic. Hungary, Polantd,  Rtessia & CIS,  Slovak Republic.
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Cash Flows to Asian Equity Mutual Funds
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The figures  report  monthly  averages  of cash to and from Asian  funds  in the U.S. and Great
Britain.
Source:  Bank  for  International  Settlements,  68th  Annual  ReportFigure 7
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The  figure  reports  aggregate  values  (across  funds)  of  quarterly  injections  (positive  values)  /
redemptions  (negative) and the net asset values (NAVs) values of U.S.-based  Latin American mutual
funds.  Injections  (redemptions)  reflect  percent  increases  (decreases)  of  the  number  of  the  funds'
outstanding shares, i.e. 0.1 stands for 10 percent.  NAVs are in billions of U.S. dollars.
Source: Momingstar  and the Securities and Exchange Commission,  U.S.Table 4
Average Short-Term Positions of Latin American Funds
(As Percentage of Total Net Assets)
All Funds  4.44  4.57  4.37
Large  Funds  6.97  8.40  5.22
Medium Funds  3.81  2.24  4.40
Small Funds  4.16  4.48  3.61
The table displays the average short-term  positions (mostly in cash) held by Latin American mutual
funds. Injection (redemption) times  are  defined as  periods  when the  number of  the  fund's
outstanding shares increases (decreases). Large Mutual Funds are Merrill Lynch Latin America,
Fidelity Latin America and Scudder Latin America. Medium Mutual Fund is TCW/Dean Witter
Latin America Growth. Small Mutual Funds are BT Investment Latin America Equity, Excelsior
Latin America,  Govett Latin America,  Ivy South America, Morgan Stanley  Dean Witter Institutional
Latin America,  TCW Galileo Latin America  Equity.
Source:  Securities  and Exchange Commission,  U.S.Appendix Table
This appendix lists the different data sets used throughout the paper.
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Net private capital  World  Bank  Figure I  Net capital flows to developing countries, including  the so-
flows  Figure 2  called  emerging  economies,  typically  middle-income
developing countries.  The amounts include bank and trade-
related lending,  portfolio equity and bond flows,  and foreign
direct investment.  The list of countries in each region are
detailed  in the figures.
Intemational  BIS, 68th  Annual  Table I  Distribution of institutional  investors between the U.S. and
institutional  investors  Report  Figure 6  Europe in 1995.
Monthly averages of cash to and from Asian funds in the
U.S. and Great Britain.
Size of the mutual  fund industry  in the U.S., Japan,  the U.K.,
and France.
Dedicated  emerging  Emerging  Market  Table  2  Country  holdings  of dedicated emerging  market  funds,  based
market  funds  Funds Research  Figure  4  inside and outside the U.S. The data are aggregate,  tracking
Figure 5  of nearly 1,400 international  emerging  market equity funds,
with an average position of about $120 billion in 1996.  The
data set covers both U.S. registered and offshore funds as
well as funds registered in Luxembourg,  United Kingdom,
Ireland,  Cayman  Islands,  Canada,  and  Switzerland. It
includes  both open and closed-end funds.
Market capitalization  Intemational  Table 2  Total market  capitalization  by country.
Finance
Corporation
U.S. mutual funds  Momingstar  Table 3  Net asset value (NAV) and number of U.S.-based mutual
Figure 3  funds.  The  funds  are  divided  in  five  categories by
investment  allocation:  all  funds,  Asia  Pacific  funds,
emerging market funds, Latin America funds, and world
funds.
Latin American  Momingstar  and  Figure 7  Aggregate values (across funds) of  quarterly injections /
mutual funds  Securities  and  redemptions  and the net asset values (NAVs)  values of U.S.-
Exchange  based  Latin  American  mutual  funds.  Injections
Commission,  U.S.  (redemptions) reflect percent increases (decreases) of the
number of the funds' outstanding  shares, i.e. 0.1 stands for
10 percent.  NAVs  are in billions of U.S. dollars.
Short-term  positions  Securities  and  Table 4  Average short-term  positions (mostly  in cash) held by Latin
of Latin American  Exchange  American mutual funds. Large Mutual Funds are Merrill
funds  Commission,  U.S.  Lynch Latin America, Fidelity Latin America and Scudder
Latin America. Medium Mutual Fund is TCW/Dean Witter
Latin  America  Growth.  Small  Mutual  Funds  are  BT
Investment  Latin America Equity, Excelsior Latin America,
Govett Latin America, Ivy South America, Morgan Stanley
Dean Witter Institutional  Latin America,  TCW Galileo Latin
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